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We show that the information-theoretic maximum entropy (MaxEnt) approach to deriving the
canonical ensemble theory is mathematically equivalent to the classic approach of Boltzmann, Gibbs
and Darwin-Fowler. The two approaches, however, “interpret” a same mathematical theorem dif-
ferently; most notably observing mean-energy in the former and energy conservation in the latter.
However, applying the same MaxEnt method to the grand canonical ensemble fails, while the correct
statistics is obtained if one carefully follows the classic approach based on Boltzmann’s microcanoni-
cal equal probability a priori. One does not need to invoke quantum mechanics, and there is no Gibbs
paradox. MaxEnt and related minimum relative entropy principle are based on the mathematical
theorem concerning large deviations of rare fluctuations. As a scientific method, it requires classical
mechanics or other assumptions to provide meaningful prior distributions for the expected-value
based statistical inference. A naive assumption of uniform prior is not valid in statistical mechanics.
PACS numbers:
There exist several frameworks, based on informa-
tion theory and/or statistical inferences [1–3], which
have been put forward as possible alternatives to the
Boltzmann-Gibbsian foundation of statistical thermody-
namics [4, 5]. At the same time, there has been a grow-
ing body of “statistical mechanical” studies of systems
and processes with no thermal molecular origin, ranging
from signal processing to combinatorial optimization, to
neural networks [6]. Almost all these studies claim Shan-
non’s information theory as their foundation [7]. These
approaches are used to deduce probability distributions
for fluctuating quantities which usually has no connection
to Newtonian mechanics.
This paper reexamines these approaches while clarify-
ing and contrasting the differences between the classic
approach to statistical mechanics and the new ones. The
principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt), or minimum
Kullbak-Leibler relative entropy [8], which is at the heart
of these information-based approach, was first proposed
by E.T. Jaynes as an alternative foundation for statistical
mechanics [1]. On the other hand, in information theory,
following the collective work of many, it is now generally
accepted that the minimum relative entropy principle is a
mathematical theorem [9–11]. It is also known as Gibbs
conditioning to probabilists [12]. Consider a sequence
of identical, independently distributed (i.i.d.) discrete
random variables X1, X2, · · · , Xn, with the state space
S = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωM} (M could be infinite) and prior dis-
tribution Pr{Xi = ωm} = pm. (In classical mechanics,
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the ωi are called microstates.) The theorem states
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
X1 = ωm
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
h(Xi) = nα
}
= p∗m, (1)
where h(·) is a function defined on the state space S and
p∗m has the “canonical” form of e
λ0+λ1h(ωm) · pm. Two
constants λ0 and λ1 are determined according to
M∑
m=1
p∗m = 1,
M∑
m=1
h(ωm)p
∗
m = α. (2)
The first condition enforces normalization; the second
one is interpreted as “conditioned on observing the mean
value for h(·)”. We shall call pm the prior. The form of
p∗m is exactly the same as that derived through minimiz-
ing the relative entropy
H ({p∗m} || {pm}) =
∞∑
m=1
p∗m ln
(
p∗m
pm
)
, (3)
under the constraints given in (2). It is important to
point out that MaxEnt is really the minimum relative
entropy with uniform prior.
This theorem is concerned with the conditional dis-
tribution of a collection of individual samples, given that
some quantity averaged over the large number of individ-
ual samples shows highly unlikely behavior. Note that if
the observed sample mean is the expected value of the
prior, then λ0 = λ1 = 0. This theorem is closely related
to the large deviation theory of empirical distribution
(i.e., histogram)
Ln(ωm) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ{Xi=ωm}, (4)
2where the delta function δ{Xi=ωm} = 1 if Xi = ωm; and
zero otherwise. According to the strong law of large num-
ber in probability theory, we know that this empirical
distribution converges to the prior distribution {pm} of
Xi. Moreover, the level-2 Sanov theorem in large devia-
tion theory [12, 14] states that for any set C of probability
distribution, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln Pr{Ln ∈ C} = − inf
µ∈C
{I(µ)}, (5)
where I(µ) =
∑n
i=1 µ(ωi) ln [µ(ωi)/pi] is the relative en-
tropy of µ with respect to the prior distribution pi.
Therefore, the relative entropy can be interpreted as the
“free energy” of deviation in the sense of a distribution
[15]. And at this juncture, the two free energies, one
from the theory of large deviation and one in the theory
of Markov dynamics [16], agree.
If we set C = {µ : 〈h(·)〉µ = α} as the space of prob-
ability distribution with given constraints, then for any
give distribution µ,
Pr
{
Ln = µ
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
h(Xi) = α
}
= Pr{Ln = µ|C} → 0,
(6)
unless µ = µ∗ where µ∗ satisfies I(µ∗) = infµ∈C{I(µ)},
i.e. with minimum relative entropy. It is implied that
the empirical distribution Ln is dominated by µ
∗ when
n→∞. Furthermore, since the distributions of different
Xi under the constraint
1
n
∑n
i=1 h(Xi) = α are identical,
the limiting distribution µ∗ for Ln also holds for each Xi.
If one assumes uniform prior distribution in the canon-
ical ensemble due to ignorance and constrains based on
the observed mean energy h(·), then the posterior dis-
tribution h(Xi) is just the exponential, canonical distri-
bution. On the other hand, Jaynes [1] argued that the
entropy of statistical mechanics and the entropy in infor-
mation theory are principally the same thing, and simply
maximizing the entropy
S ({p∗m}) =
∞∑
m=1
p∗m ln p
∗
m (7)
under some constraint on the mean observations would
give the correct canonical distribution. Hence such an
optimizing argument is mathematically equivalent to the
previous theorem, and consequently statistical mechan-
ics could be re-interpreted as a particular application of a
general theory of logical inference and information theory
[17]. While Jaynes’ approach to statistical mechanics, as
well as the widely-used minimum relative entropy prin-
ciple in information theory, is based on observations of
mean-energy, the classic approach of Boltzmann, Gibbs
and Darwin-Fowler to statistical mechanics interprets the
same theorem differently.
For the canonical ensemble, suppose it is a part of a
larger microcanonical ensemble consisting of N closed,
identical canonical ensembles. Let Xi represent the mi-
crostate of the i-th canonical ensemble, say momenta
and positions (p, q). Then the high dimensional vector
X = (X1, X2, ..., XN ) represents a microstate in the mi-
crocannonical ensemble. Let the function e(Xi) be the
energy of the i-th canonical ensemble, and the total en-
ergy Etot =
∑N
i=1 e(Xi). The law of classical mechanical
energy conservation says the X is only confined in the
subspace {Etot = H} where H is the given total energy
of the larger microcanonical ensemble. The notion of
equal a priori probability further assumes that the prob-
ability of X is equally distributed on such a subspace
[18]. The marginal distribution of each Xi is then expo-
nentially dependent on e(Xi) when N tends to infinity.
Boltzmann’s most probable state method and Darwin-
Fowler’s steepest descent method are all based on such a
setup and are mathematically equivalent [19]. Note that
Boltzmann, Gibbs and Darwin-Fowler deal with the con-
vergence of empirical distributions as in Eq. (5) rather
than marginal distribution as in the theorem (1). How-
ever, when N tends to infinity, the limiting empirical
distribution is the same as the limiting marginal distri-
bution.
The distribution for the high-dimensional microstate
X in Boltzmann’s approach, subjected to the energy con-
servation Etot = H , is exactly the same as that of the
MaxEnt approach conditioned on observing {e = H/N}.
Hence they are mathematically equivalent. However,
subtle differences exist in their interpretations: For the
MaxEnt approach, one must first assume the existence
of a prior distribution for the canonical ensemble even
without a constraint on the mean energy. In the clas-
sic approach, the equal a priori probability of the entire
microcanonical ensemble can be verified from such a uni-
form prior distribution of the independent subsystems
without any constraint in the MaxEnt principle. That is
why Jaynes called this framework “subjective thermody-
namics” [1].
However, the reasnoning behind using a uniform prior
distribution as the most suitable one when one knows
nothing of any random variable is only empirical, and
one must be very careful when applying it to a specific
scientific problem. For example, if one only knows the
mean particle number in a grand-canonical ensemble, this
principle would conclude that the particle number distri-
bution is likewise exponential (i.e., geometric). But the
experimentally observed distribution is Poissonian when
the particle is nearly independent, whether distinguish-
able or not (see below for detailed discussion). Hence
only justifying the form of the energy distribution in the
canonical ensemble is not a sufficient proof for the valid-
ity of the MaxEnt principle as substitute for the classical
statistic mechanics. In other words, the maximum en-
tropy or minimum relative entropy principle, by itself,
can never tell you the prior distribution. The prior dis-
tribution has to be supplied by the specific problem to
which the principle is applied. Of course, for the pur-
pose of data analysis exclusively, this technique could be
quite useful in supplying a minimal model maximizing
the degree of freedoms beyond the given constraints [20].
3Professional statisticians would also use other methods
to test the uniform prior hypothesis after the analysis of
the data.
Now the central question arises: What are exactly
the prior distributions of energy and particle number for
the grand-canonical ensemble? Gibbs tried to answer
this question more than one hundred years ago, starting
from the equal probability priori. His derivation for en-
ergy fluctuation was highly successful, but for the grand-
canonical ensemble with fluctuating particle numbers, a
difficulty known as Gibbs paradox arises: Whether or not
the phase space volume φ(E, v, n) =
∫
d3nq d3np used in
grand-canonical ensemble should be divided by n!. It is
now understood that for microcanonical or canonical en-
sembles, both with fixed particle number, the paradox is
not a well-defined problem [22].
Similar to the deviation for canonical ensembles, and
still suppose a large microcanonical ensemble with to-
tal energy, volume and particle number invariant. The
box further consists of N open, identical small grand-
canonical ensembles each with fixed volume v and mean
particle number 〈n〉. They are statistically identical but
not rigorously independent. The phase-space uniformity
states that the high-dimensional microstate space con-
sists of all the N〈n〉 particles in the large box uniformly
distributed in position and momentum [18], and ask what
is the distribution of particle numbers within a small
grand-canonical ensemble. Hence the natural method-
ology is to calculate the number of high-dimensional mi-
crostates corresponding to a given energy E and particle
numbers n in a grand-canonical volume. This number
of high-dimensional microstates would give the weight
(probability) of such a microstate in the smaller subsys-
tem. The relation between a small subsystem and the
rest of the “reservoir” is a rather subtle issue, which has
been repeatedly emphasized in statistical physics.
Textbooks [21] often proceed in the same manner as in
the treatment of the canonical ensemble through Boltz-
mann’s most probable distribution method. This is a
little misleading. The key to this problem lies on how to
go about reconstructing the high-dimensional microstate
from those low-dimensional microstates for each subsys-
tem. There is no problem for the canonical ensemble,
since one can obtain the high-dimensional microstate
simply from linking all the microstates of each subsys-
tem together. However, in the case of distinguishable
particles, we must take into account the partition of
all N〈n〉 particles into the N identical subsystems for
the grand canonical ensemble. Let mi be the number
of grand canonical ensembles whose microstates contain-
ing ni particles with energy Ei. Hence, for any possible
distribution {mi} of the microstates in grand canonical
ensembles, there are two kinds of partitions: one is a
partition of these occupation numbers {mi} into a to-
tal of N subsystems; the other is the partition of all the
N〈n〉 particles (i.e. labeling particles) into the possible
set {ni}. The canonical ensemble only deals with the
former, and in textbooks, for grand canonical ensembles,
they also only consider the former one, while the factorial
n! comes from the latter partition of particles [22, 23].
Hence, the number of all high-dimensional microstates
corresponding to {mi} is given by
W ({mi}) =
N !∑
imi!
×
(N〈n〉)!∑
i (ni!)
mi ,
subject to the three constrains:∑
i
mi = N,
∑
i
Eimi = Etot,
∑
i
nimi = N〈n〉,
which could be maximized to derive the correct statistics
of grand canonical ensembles.
For indistinguishable particles, the weight for each
high-dimensional microstate in the large microcanoni-
cal ensemble is already different from the distinguishable
case and the factorial naturally arises due consideration
of the phase space volume. Hence it is well-known that
although the n! would not appear because of the partition
of particles into small subsystems, it would emerge from
the phase space volume in this case. Therefore, Gibbs
paradox is definitely not related to quantum mechanics,
and the partition function for grand-canonical ensemble
should be written as
Ξ =
∑
E,n
Q(E, v, n)
n!
e−µn, (8)
where Q(E, v, n) is the partition function for the canon-
ical ensemble.
For independent distinguishable particles, one could
understand the n! from another perspective. Due to the
phase space uniformity assumption, the position distribu-
tion for each particle is uniformly distributed in this large
system with total volume Nv. Then at a certain time,
the probability for each particle belonging to a specific
subsystem is 1
N
. Notice that the total number of particle
is N〈n〉, hence the distribution of the particle number in
this subsystem is Binomial with parameter (N〈n〉, 1
N
).
When 〈n〉 is fixed and N tends to infinity, it converges to
a Poisson distribution with mean 〈n〉. The factorial just
comes out from the expression of the Poisson distribution
pn =
λn
n!
e−λ, (9)
where λ = 〈n〉. This is known as Poisson statistics for a
point process, which has been experimentally verified in
number fluctuation measurement based on fluorescence
correlation spectroscopy (FCS) [24]. Furthermore, when
N tends to infinity, the positions of the particles must
converge to the well-known Poisson point process and
4the number of particles within a certain space is just its
counting process.
Let us now come back to the maximum entropy or
minimum relative entropy principle. It is worth notic-
ing that the phase space uniformity is of course another
form of maximum entropy for the microcanonical ensem-
ble without any additional constraint [18] but is different
from Jaynes’ framework. There is even confusionregard-
ing the fact that the derivation of the canonical ensemble
distribution by Darwin-Fowler is an application of max-
imum entropy approach. This is not the case. Althouth
they are based on same mathematical theorem, they are
definitely different interpretations. What Darwin-Fowler
did was to derive the distribution of the subsystem from
the whole phase space uniformity assumption [19]. They
did not mention anything like the uniform prior distri-
bution of the subsystem. The most important element
in Darwin-Fowler’s interpretation is still the role of con-
servation of energy at the level of a whole, isolated sys-
tem, the First Law of Thermodynamics. They actually
justified a special version of the law of large number in
the empirical distribution space for canonical ensemble,
and finally got the limiting distribution which was ex-
actly Boltzmann’s most probable state [19]. We clarify
a confusion regarding their terminology. The “mean” in
their work is just the mean occupation number of each
microstate of the subsystem, which is exactly the proba-
bility rather than the real mean of the fluctuating energy.
Jaynes’ information approach to classical mechanics is
a method of statistical inference based on macroscopic
observables, i.e., expected values, in contrast to main
stream statistics whose inferences are often based on
samples. In both approaches, a prior in the absence of
any measurement can only be subjective. In the present
paper, we have shown that the Principle of Maximum
Entropy can not fully replace the classical Boltzmann-
Gibbs statistical mechanics precisely because the latter
built their “prior” based on (1) uniformity in Newtonian
mechanical phase space, and (2) conservation of energy,
number, etc. These two assumptions are fundamentally
outside any logical inference approach. The case in point
is the grand canonical ensemble: mechanical phase space
uniformity necessarily leads to a Poisson distribution as
the prior for the number distribution of independent clas-
sical particles in an infinitesimal open box.
L. Szilard and B. Mandelbrot also advanced another
line of interpretation for classical thermodynamics, called
purely phenomenological theory, based on the theory of
sufficient statistics [2, 3]. Interestingly, it is also based on
the above mentioned mathematical theorem, and it as-
serts that all the macroscopic thermodynamic quantities
are exactly the sufficient statistics of their microscopic
fluctuations. The theory gives the correct distribution
when a given ensemble has been perturbed but the new
system still has the conservation law. It implies that all
of the distributions in statistical mechanics must belong
to the exponential family of probability distributions [25].
In the present study, we clarified E.T. Jaynes’ Max-
Ent approach to the statistical thermodynamic based on
information theory, and its relation to classical statisti-
cal mechanics. It is found that correctly determining a
prior distribution is the central issue, which could not be
addressed in general from only information theory or sta-
tistical inference. Of course, as a mathematical theory,
the theorem of minimum relative entropy could be ap-
plied everywhere and not just be confined to mechanics or
physics. It justifies the diverse use of “statistical mechan-
ics”, and explains why it works as a fundamental tool in
information theory. More importantly, the mathematical
theorem also tells us that the concepts of entropy and rel-
ative entropy are both mathematical constructions, both
of which naturally arise in the asymptotic probability of
large deviations [14].
It is arguable that information theory, at least in its
mathematical presentation, is a statistical theory en-
dowed with the concept of entropy. This perspective
naturally resolves a nagging issue that troubles “informa-
tion” as a more general theoretic concept: The relation
between information and knowledge [26]. It is well under-
stood that thermodynamics is about what is impossible
(for macroscopic systems) and what is very unlikely. It
provides constraints on molecular processes, but it can-
not specify their mechanisms. Knowledge is ultimately
in the mechanism. There seems to be a contradistinction
between “statistics” and “knowledge.”
There is another, dynamic origin of the concept of en-
tropy and relative entropy (or free energy). It has been
shown recently that they are emergent properties of any
Markovian processes [16]. The original Shannon’s infor-
mation theory for coding, however, is a static one.
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